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ABOUT

THE

JOHN W. HOLMES MEMORIAL LECTURE SERIES

The Academic Council on the United Nations System
inaugurated the John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture Series in
1989 in honor of a founding member of ACUNS. Mr. Holmes
had served on the planning committee for the founding
conference of ACUNS and the provisional committee in 198788. The talk he prepared for the first ACUNS Annual Meeting in
1988, Looking Backwards and Forwards, was the first publication
in the Councilís series of Reports and Papers.
John W. Holmes joined the Canadian Department of External
Affairs in 1943 and participated in the planning of the United
Nations. He attended the preparatory commission in 1945 and
the first session of the General Assembly, and later served as
head of UN Affairs in Ottawa and as Under-Secretary of the
Department of External Affairs. In 1960, he left public service
for a second career in teaching and scholarship, basing himself
at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the
University of Toronto.
Mr. Holmes brought to the Academic Council a lifetime of
experience and reflection on international politics and the role of
the United Nations. He also brought a marvelous mix of idealism
and realism, a mix that showed up clearly in the report, Looking
Backwards and Forwards. In the conclusion, he spoke of the need
for reexamining the role of the UN in a way that captures the
basic purposes of the Academic Council. It is an ideal time, he
said, to launch in all our countries that renewed examination of
past experience of the UN, to discover on what we can build and
where not to venture, how we can use the growing threat to the
globe itself to create the will for international self-discipline
which is what international institutions are all about.
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Global Governance and the Changing
Face of International Law
1. PERCEPTIONS

OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Adaptation, flexibility and change are not words that many
seem to associate with international law. As a result, the
proposition that international law is a factor for change in
international affairs appears unrealistic. But I would like to take
the opportunity of this Holmes Lecture to tell you why I believe
international law is a factor for adaptation and change in
international relations, and how I see it remaining as a factor in
global governance into the future.
Two of the more persistent criticisms leveled at international
law are that:
1. it is a utopian system that does not take into account power
and politics; and
2. that it is static and not relevant to world affairs.
Examples exist to justify these criticisms. Focusing on specific
shortcomings, however, misses the dynamism of international
law. Although the space of a lecture does not allow a
comprehensive examination of how international law has
changed to meet new situations, I hope that insight into how it
works, how it has addressed power, and how it has adapted
might provide a deeper understanding of how to assess its
performance, utility, and relevance to issues of global
governance.
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I propose to do this by looking at three periods that encompass
the development of several significant features of contemporary
international life. The three periods are:
I.

The Voluntarist Period (begins circa 1648)

II. The Institutionalist Period (begins circa 1899)
III. The Civil Society Period (begins circa 1975)
Each of these periods highlights a particular development and
demonstrates how international law has adapted to changing
conditions by drawing from the experience of one period to
build the next. The implications of these developments for
shaping future values and community will also be considered.
I identify only a starting point to the periods because significant
features of each period remain with us today. The periods and
their features overlap and interact.

2. GROWTH

OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW

In its most basic form, international law is recognized as a body
of rules and practices that regulates state behavior in the
conduct of international relations. But, in the three and a half
centuries since modern international law’s establishment in
international relations, much has changed. Christian Wiktor’s
chronological presentation of all multilateral treaties from 1648
to 1995 shows the changes in the subject matter of multilateral
treaties. We find the first non-political or non-military treaty in
this collection in 1691 — the Provisional Convention Regarding
Commerce and Navigation in France — with the next appearing
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in 1815 — Rules Concerning the Navigation of the Rhine River,
followed by the Convention Relative to Navigation of the Elbe
in 1822.
From 1850 to the present, the number of treaties and treaty
subjects has mushroomed. First, let us take a look at the subject
matter of treaties. Table 1 organizes multilateral treaties into
general treaty subjects. These subject listings represent a
simplification of the more than 250 subject headings used by
the United Nations to classify treaties. The seven categories are:
political/diplomatic, military, economic, human welfare,
cultural, environment and other.
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In addition to the change in subject matter, it is important to
keep in mind the large increase in multilateral treaty activity
over these several hundred years. Compare the fact that there
were 86 multilateral treaties for the first 100 years of this
collection to the more than 2,000 multilateral treaties for the 25
year period between 1951 and 1975. The data also show a dropoff in the number of new multilateral treaties being concluded
in the last period covered — 1976-1995.
It may also be helpful to understand that of the 6,000
multilateral treaties, only 30% are general multilateral treaties,
that is, open to all states for participation. Seventy percent are
plurilateral treaties that are limited in participation by
geographic region or by subject matter. Explosive as these
numbers are, multilateral treaties are only 10% of all treaty
activity in the world. The bulk of international activity and
international law remains on a bilateral basis. And treaties
themselves are only one form of expressing transnational
activity that also includes informal arrangements and practices.

3. FUNCTIONS

AND

MODALITIES

OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW

The level of international interaction as expressed through
treaty activity has created a more complex and interwoven
system of legal relationships. Fundamentally, international law
serves the purpose, as a factor in ordering international
relations, of managing by systemic change and adaptation the
conflict generated by power and politics. Treaties are a tool
used for this purpose and an expression of the political
solutions arrived at. Thus, to the extent that E.H. Carr was
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critical of those who conceived of international law as divorced
from politics, he was right. He wrote:
Every system of law presupposes an initial political decision,
whether explicit or implied, whether achieved by voting or
by bargaining or by force, as to the authority entitled to
make and unmake law. Behind all law there is this
necessary political background. The ultimate authority of
law derives from politics.2
Effective operation of the law, international or otherwise,
requires that three elements be in alignment:
*

a legal concept that is developed enough to be
communicated clearly;

*

a structure or framework that can support the operation of
the law; and

*

the political consensus and will of the system’s members to
use the law.

Where law has failed, its failure can be traced to the absence of
one of these elements.
International law provides the framework for political discourse
among members of the international system. The framework
does not guarantee consensus, but it does foster the ongoing
discourse and participation needed to provide conceptual clarity
in developing legal obligations and gaining their acceptance. In
playing this role, international law performs two different
functions — one is to provide a framework for cross border
interactions, and another is to shape the values and goals these
interactions are pursuing. Paul Diehl and I have called the first
set of functions the “operating system” of international law, and
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the second set the “normative system.”3 Critics of international
law perceive its failure because of their expectation that
international law will change a particular behavior or solve a
specific problem, even though the international legal framework
may sustain the political discourse and interaction that
eventually leads to a solution.
International law today has moved towards acknowledging that
there are some forms of behavior that are so repugnant to global
order that they are generally proscribed. These jus cogens norms
emphasize the protection of human dignity and ban such
practices as slavery, torture, and genocide. Thus, the separation
between the operating and the normative may not always be
clear. Understanding the relationship between the two is
further complicated by the volume of interactions that
constitutes international relations today.
If there is an enduring theme to international relations, it is one
of expansion and diffusion — both in the number of actors and
in the number of subject matters dealt with at the interstate
level. This has in turn led to a diffusion of power among the
actors in the system, although not necessarily a diminution of
each actor’s power. How well international law has expanded
its framework to address this diffusion is a key test of
international law’s relevance to global governance questions in
the future. The track record as I see it is a strong one, and I
would now like to turn to the three periods (the voluntarist, the
institutionalist, and the civil society) to support this
observation.
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4. THE VOLUNTARIST PERIOD (begins circa 1648)
Although the sovereignty and the independence of states are
now so well established that it is hard to imagine a time
without them, it is useful to recall that other forms of
governance were available to structure the global order of the
17th century. As Hendrik Spruyt described, the state emerged
from “a particular conjuncture of social and political interests in
Europe.”4 This conjuncture itself was the product of the
structured interactions and political environment of the
European Middle Ages.5 State practice then developed the
concept of sovereignty as the basis for self-regulated and
independent action.6 I call this period “voluntarist,” because
during this period states were obligated to do very little beyond
what they specifically accepted.
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 gave expression to these
interests and provided the basis for the development of the state
system. The Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years’
War created certain assumptions, for both modern international
relations and law. These are based on the existence of
independent states that are:
*

sovereign within their own territories,

*

equal to one another,

*

not answerable to any higher external authority, and

*

not bound without their consent.

Translated into twentieth century terms, these assumptions can
be found in the United Nations Charter in the concepts of
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territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs.
These external characteristics grew out of a need for internal
cohesion and governance to support economic activity and
growing populations. Although Westphalia concentrated power
within states, it also diffused power externally by making states
answerable to no higher authority than themselves.7
The Peace of Westphalia not only addressed the privileges of
state power, but also provided for the ongoing responsibility of
the victor states, Sweden and France, to “ensure that the
privileges and immunities conferred on the Princes and the free
cities of Germany in the treaty shall be upheld and
maintained.”8 As part of the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of
Muenster provided for peaceful settlement of disputes through
forms of arbitration or mediation, obligated parties to a cooling
off period of three years prior to initiating hostilities in case of a
dispute, and called for sanctions if these conditions were not
fulfilled. As a stepping stone to current international legal
practices, these were significant developments. The consensus
that the Peace of Westphalia was the cornerstone of
contemporary international law results from the enduring
relevance of the procedures it established.
The Peace of Westphalia also marked the end of the hierarchy
that flowed from the temporal authority of the pope and the
Catholic Church. This paved the way for a system of
international relations open to any state willing and able to
discharge obligations for the general maintenance of orderly
international relations.9 A system of coexisting, coequal

9

political units was created without regard to religion or form of
government - republics as well as monarchies were accepted as
long as they followed the precepts of the Westphalian system of
international relations. Certain institutional features tied to
territory were required to carry out these precepts. These features
included effective control of a defined territory and population
and a government capable of discharging international
obligations. Under these conditions, republics like the Dutch
Republic and eventually the United States joined the system.
In breaking its ties to the religious teachings of the Catholic
Church, this new “secularized” international law focused on the
development of state values and gave prominence to the liberty
of states. It supported the operation of a voluntarist approach
based on individual state consent and the balance of power. To
the extent that states functioned within a common set of
values, they did so principally within a framework of selfpreservation. Law functioned through rather than above states,
and state consent was key to the undertaking of any legal
obligation. Classic expression of this understanding is found in
the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in
the 1927 Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey):
International law governs relations between independent
States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore
emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent
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communities or with a view to the achievement of common
aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot
therefore be presumed.10

Evaluating The Voluntarist Legacy
The practice of this period is the legacy of what Louis Henkin
called “state values,”11 such as territorial integrity, equality of
states, and protection from external interference. In the
voluntarist period, states and sovereigns were the principal
actors, and the primary concern of international law was the
preservation of the elements of power for the state as the
primary unit of international relations. The voluntarist period
contributed substantially to international law’s operating system
by laying the groundwork for state independence and
responsibility. This led to the formalization of elements of
international law’s operating system that we recognize today as
encompassing sovereign immunity, the law of armed conflict,
alliances and treaty-based relations. The voluntarist period was
one of state or sovereign consent, in which the capacity to
project military power was the ultimate means of addressing
and resolving conflict. The state had the capacity both to
preserve order and to create disorder.12
Developments in this period were chiefly of an operating
character since those were the needs of the system. The
Industrial Revolution had not yet given rise to the modern
technologies of power projection. States developed few
universal norms, in part because there were few transnational
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problems, and the potential destruction that unfettered state
power could unleash was not fully realized until the 20th
century. By then, the state’s capacity to destroy was covered by
a veil of sovereignty to shield itself from external scrutiny. In a
celebrated note entitled, “Away with the ‘S’Word,” written
when he was president of the American Society of International
Law, Louis Henkin observed that:
Sovereignty sometimes subsumes-and conceals-important
values. It is used to express the essential quality of a state,
the basic entity, abstract but real, of the international political
system. “Sovereignty” is used to describe the autonomy of
states and the need for state consent to make law and build
institutions. “Sovereignty” is used to justify and define the
“privacy” of states, their political independence and territorial
integrity; their right and the rights of their people to be let
alone and to go their own way.
But sovereignty has also grown a mythology of state grandeur
and aggrandizement that misconceives the concept and
clouds what is authentic and worthy in it, a mythology that
is often empty and sometimes destructive of human values.13
Much as technological advances and economic interests had
contributed to the formation of the state itself in the 17th and
18th centuries, so too the advances and interests of the 19th
and early 20th centuries indicated the inadequacy of the
territorially defined state to address them. By the mid-20th
century, the advantages of cooperation outweighed the
advantages of autonomy, and states were willing to strike
“sovereignty bargains,” such as the integration of important state
functions in the European Union.14 More than a century before,
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European states had already recognized the cooperative and
joint management of resources like rivers as an interest worth
curbing their independence. As an operating system,
international law provided them a framework within which to
pursue these goals.
The voluntarist period acknowledged power in international
relations by accepting it and by not seeking to ban the use of
force in pursuit of state goals. Two factors, however, created an
impetus for change:
1. The increase in the destructive capacity of states already in
evidence in the 19th century.
2. A tentative but emerging international political consensus to
seek an alternative to the voluntarist approach that was held
responsible for the devastation that World War I brought to
Europe.
In an effort to restrain the unfettered freedom of states to
destroy themselves and their citizens, political leaders in the
wake of World War I sought alternative approaches to managing
power and conflict. This led to the creation of the security
structures first of the League of Nations and then of the United
Nations. The League and the UN were to be more than
alliances. They were to be multipurpose institutions that could
prevent conflict by providing for a range of techniques for the
peaceful settlement of disputes. They were to facilitate a
collective response to any unilateral attack on a member state.
And they were mandated to address the economic and social
roots of conflict as a means of preventing it.
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As the state had emerged from the confluence of several
political streams, the fashioning of the institutionalist image
also grew out of the convergence of what Inis Claude called
objective and subjective conditions. The objective conditions
were ones of independent units interacting across borders. The
subjective conditions were an awareness of shared problems and
the desire to create means to manage them.15 The subjective
conditions converged in the early 20th century with an
exponential increase in a state’s capacity to destroy. These
forces came together to convince statesmen and academics alike
of the necessity for alternatives to the voluntarist approach.

5. THE INSTITUTIONALIST PERIOD (begins circa 1899)
The 19th century ended with the First Hague Peace Conference
in 1899, called to restrict the damage that states could inflict on
each other’s populations by outlawing particular kinds of
weapons (poison gas and exploding bullets are examples) and to
limit the arms race. This approach recognized that certain
problems were general in character and required the cooperation
of all powers, whether large or small. It further recognized that
there were problems that required long-term attention, including
a need to restrain the freedom of states to wage war on each
other. The Hague system therefore introduced the concept of
general long-term commitments by all states — not just
important states — to restrict their behavior in order to ensure
self-preservation. It also moved to institutionalize alternatives to
military force to resolve conflicts and introduced the idea of
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international legal institutions to serve that purpose. A system
of public law arbitration that still exists today is a legacy of the
Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907.
As the Peace of Westphalia recognized new actors in international relations, the Covenant of the League of Nations took
steps to curb the freedom of states to use force at will and
empowered a collective entity composed of states to call states
to action when needed. As the events that led to World War II
unfolded and the League of Nations was seen as incapable of
addressing the challenges posed by aggressor states which had
either withdrawn or been expelled from League membership,
Anglo-American proposals for international institutions and law
as means to resolve conflicts acquired an increasingly utopian
character that looked further and further removed from power
and reality.
Carr noted in The Twenty Years’Crisis that: “Since 1919, natural
law has resumed its sway, and theories of international law have
become more markedly utopian than at any previous time.”16
Traumatized by the western front and ignoring the power that
lay behind their own successful domestic legal institutions,
proponents of such theories crafted institutional frameworks for
the peaceful settlement of disputes, when the real problem was
the existence of states determined to use military force to pursue
their interests.
The heart of the League’s security guarantee was in Article 10 of
the Covenant. It provided that: “The Members of the League
undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression
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the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all
Members of the League.” If a member were attacked, the League
Council was authorized (not obligated) to call on League
members to undertake an appropriate response. The deterrent
character of the response depended on League members acting
collectively and automatically when a violation occurred. As
history demonstrated and as Carr noted, the voluntarist
assumptions of international relations were far from replaced by
this institutionalist approach.
No matter what the League Covenant required, states turned out
to be unwilling to act other than on their own behalf. The
inability of the entire League membership to act as a unit put it
at a disadvantage when challenged by such politically
determined and militarily strong powers as Germany and Japan
in the pursuit of their interests. Stark realization of the League’s
ineffectiveness as a security system came when Poland invoked
its alliance with France and Britain for help, not Article 10 of
the Covenant, after its invasion by Germany in September 1939.
Article 10 was meant to deter, and provisions for dispute
settlement were made elsewhere — in Articles 13 and 15. The
League of Nations Covenant provided for arbitration and the
judicial settlement of disputes, including the setting up of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. If states chose not to
use either of these methods for settling disputes, the Covenant
required that the dispute be brought to the League Council,
where the dispute might be examined and addressed before the
disputing parties went to war. Failure to do so was supposed to
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bring about sanctions on the violator, but the League’s inability
to contain and to reverse aggression, despite its efforts to
impose sanctions, discredited both international law and the
League as an institution that could provide any meaningful
security guarantees to its members.
Proponents of international law had placed their faith in Article
19 of the League Covenant, which provided:
The Assembly may from time to time advise the
reconsideration by members of the League of treaties
which have become inapplicable and the consideration
of international conditions whose continuance might
endanger the peace of the world.
Pitman Potter explained that the motivation for Article 19 was
to allow for “a periodic revision of obsolete treaties and of
international situations dangerous to peace” in order to
“provide a means of correcting mistakes which might be made
at the time and to provide for changes of conditions with the
passage of time.”17
Although the idea may have seemed sound to those drafting
Article 19, the political conditions within which Article 19 had
to operate made it impossible for reliance on this provision to
produce results.18 The concern that Article 19 would be used to
unravel the Versailles political settlement that accompanied the
creation of the League effectively denied to all members this
means for incremental change.19 Recalling the three elements
that must be kept in alignment for effective legal developments
to occur (clarity of the norm, structure through which to
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implement the norm, and the political consensus and will to
use it), Article 19 failed to achieve the necessary political
consensus among states to make it work.
Despite the League of Nations’failure to deter Axis aggression,
the experiment in international cooperation through
international institutions was not completely discredited. On
the contrary, much of what the League initiated was continued
by the United Nations, which took over the League’s facilities
and assets. The United Nations’permanent secretariat and
headquarters were modeled on the League. The International
Court of Justice continued the operations of the Permanent
Court of International Justice. Both the League and the UN
coordinated ambitious postwar economic assistance and
recovery programs.
The United Nations was established to avoid the weaknesses of
the League of Nations that had caused it to fail to address
effectively the power and state interests of the interwar period.
Although based on the principle of sovereign equality, the UN
Charter conferred a particular responsibility for maintaining
peace and security on the major powers (China, the United
Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France) that
collectively had defeated the Axis powers. The special status and
responsibility of these powers were confirmed by their
permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council.
The operating assumptions of the voluntarist period were
therefore incorporated in the UN system in the role of the
major powers. The UN’s founders accepted that without at
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least the tacit consent of the major powers, it would be futile
for the institution to attempt to address threats to peace.
They also accepted that action against one of the major
powers was unlikely to be effective and therefore should not
be attempted — the veto in the Security Council for
permanent members was designed to protect the UN from
exceeding its capacity for effective action. Despite this
recognition of power realities, aspects of the United Nations
security apparatus were still unworkable in the political
context of the Cold War. The earmarking of troops, for
example, for use in United Nations operations (as provided by
Article 43 of the UN Charter) never materialized.

Evaluating the Institutionalist Legacy
By attempting to distance law from politics and to use law in
the League while disregarding state power and interests,
proponents of law fell into the utopian trap that Carr described.
The UN Charter has avoided this trap by acknowledging
differences in power through the permanent member structure
of the Security Council. However, the UN is having a hard time
adjusting a system based on post-World War II assumptions
about which states could, and therefore should, carry the larger
responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution to one that
may reflect more accurately the power of states today. But, by
joining law and power and focusing on international law as a
framework and as a process, the UN has realized a much more
dynamic and realistic concept of the operation of law.
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States themselves have promoted change within the
institutionalist framework. A dramatic example can be seen in
decolonization. We might consider the First Hague Peace
Conference in 1899, where 26 states were represented, as a
baseline. At the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, 44
states were represented. The United Nations today has 189
members. The numbers are even more impressive if considered
in terms of people. Harold Jacobson observed that, in 1945,
“almost one quarter of the world’s population lived in
dependent territories. By 1970 less than 1 percent of the world’s
population inhabited territories that had not attained self-rule,
and by 1983 the number had been reduced to just over twotenths of 1 percent.”20
Geographically, the wave of independence started in the 18th
century in North America, then spread in the 19th century to
Latin America, and in the 20th century to the Middle East,
Asia, Africa, and, most recently after the Cold War, to the
former Soviet Union. As Jacobson concluded, decolonization
resulted in a “significant restructuring of the global political
system, and this restructuring has been achieved with
remarkably little violence.”21
Decolonization was all the more remarkable because there was
neither legal basis nor precedent for it. It just gained a form of
legal momentum propelled by state interests and economic
necessity that began in the 1950s as a moral stand and within
twenty years was accepted as “obligatory to bring forward
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dependent peoples to independence if they so chose, even
though Article 73 had spoken only of self-government.”22
As a result of decades of interaction in multilateral frameworks,
the forms of law themselves have changed. This is expressed in
the growing body of United Nations law and the new
political/legal environment created by practices of international
organizations. Oscar Schachter noted that: “UN political bodies
— though denied legislative power — could act like legislatures
by adopting law-making treaties and declarations of law.”23
Though states remain the principal law-making authority,
increasingly they work through frameworks provided by
international institutions. Recognition and reliance on venues
like the UN General Assembly mean that debates held in such
organs themselves may become part of the law-making process.
Substantively, contemporary issues that require a universal
approach may be more readily addressed in such general forums
like the organs of the United Nations or at UN sponsored
worldwide conferences. Jonathan Charney concluded that
“[t]he augmented role of multilateral forums in devising,
launching, refining and promoting general international law
has provided the international community with a more formal
lawmaking process that is used often.”24
Another form of institutional influence is seen in the role
played by the UN secretariat in moving a statute for the
International Criminal Court to completion. This is an example
of how the intergovernmental and multilateral treaty-making
process under UN sponsorship provides opportunity for
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influence by skilled staff carrying out the intricate coordination
and drafting tasks required for preparation of such major
agreements.25
And as members of the Academic Council on the United
Nations System are certainly aware, international institutions
themselves are not frozen in time and have life cycles, including
a surprisingly high mortality rate.26 For example, one-third of
international governmental organizations operating in 1981 no
longer existed in 1992. The growth in the number of
international institutions is also not an incremental one, but
rather one that “occasionally plateau[s] following periodic
organizing bursts.”27
Table 2 shows the number of multilateral treaties that created an
international organization. It also shows the number of
multilateral treaties that addresses some aspect of an
international organization other than to create it. The growth
spurts can be seen in the number of treaties that create
international organizations. However, it is interesting to note
that even the increased numbers represent only a modest
portion of overall treaty activity.
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TABLE 2:
MULTILATERAL TREATIES

AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
1648-1995
Time Period

Total # of
Treaties

Breakdown
Number

Percent of Total

1648-1750

86

No link: 86

100%

1751-1850

100

No link:100

100%

1851-1899

338

No link: 324

96 %

Creates an IO: 3

1%

Some link to an IO:

1900-1925

1926-1950

1951-1975

1976-1995

663

1183

11

3%

No link: 588
Creates an IO: 30
Some link to an IO:

91 %
5%

3

4%

No link: 1001
Creates an IO: 58
Some link to an IO:

91 %
5%

44

4%

No link: 158

79 %

Creates an IO: 165
Some link to an IO:
253

8%

2047

1619

13 %

No link: 1459
Creates an IO: 100
Some link to an IO:

90 %
6%

60

4%
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A census of international institutions tells us that at the end of
the 20th century “there are more than 250 conventional
international governmental organizations (IGOs), more than
1500 other international bodies and roughly 3700 other
institutions of special types, making a total of almost 5500.”28 In
1998, the UN registered 1,528 nongovernmental organizations,
40% of which were based in the United States. Despite this
seeming dominance by the United States, it is less than what it
had been a decade before.
Such a large number of institutions and level of activity have not
left the political landscape untouched; international institutions
have made their mark on law making today. They have done so
not only by increasing the number of state actors through
decolonization and by providing the possibility of participation
by nongovernmental organizations, but also by carving out a
legal status of their own. This was given expression in the
International Court of Justice’s 1949 Advisory Opinion on the
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations in
which the Court acknowledged that the United Nations
“possess[ed]...a large measure of international personality and
the capacity to operate upon an international plane.”29
And finally, international institutions have expanded the
international political space to allow for the protection and
participation of private associations and individuals in areas of
international activity. Most prominent examples of this
development are the European Union and the European Court
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of Human Rights. In the case of the European Union, AnneMarie Slaughter and Walter Mattli wrote:
Until 1963 the enforcement of the Rome treaty, like that of
any other international treaty, depended entirely on action
by the national legislatures of the member states of the
community. By 1965, a citizen of a community country
could ask a national court to invalidate any provision of
domestic law found to conflict with certain directly
applicable provisions of the treaty. By 1975, a citizen of an
EC country could seek the invalidation of national law
found to conflict with self-executing provisions of
community secondary legislation, the “directives” to
national governments passed by the EC Council of
Ministers. And by 1990, community citizens could ask their
national courts to interpret national legislation consistently
with community legislation in the face of undue delay in
passing directives on the part of national legislatures.30
This development, together with the pathbreaking rights
provided individuals in the European Convention on Human
Rights through rulings of the European Court of Human Rights,
has given individuals a status and a role in the international
system, including rights of action against states (including their
own). Some of the likely familiar names that comprise the
landmark jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
include Lawless (1961)31 and the Belgian Linguistic Case (1968).32
International institutions therefore proved not only to be the
vehicle for the appearance of more than 100 new states through
decolonization, but also became the growing medium for
establishing the rights of private individuals and associations,

25

both in international public discourse and increasingly in the
law-making arena.
An apt segue into our third and final period comes from UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s reflection on the UN’s role in
the 21st century entitled, “We the Peoples.” In the opening
pages of this statement prepared for the Millennium Summit, he
wrote that: “We must also adapt international institutions,
through which states govern together, to the realities of the new
era. We must form coalitions for change, often with partners
well beyond the precincts of officialdom.”33 Reflecting this
development, John Rawls envisions a more explicit role for civil
society as he writes: “...it may turn out that there will be many
different kinds of organizations subject to the judgment of the
Law of Peoples and charged with regulating cooperation among
them and meeting certain recognized duties.”34

6. THE CIVIL SOCIETY PERIOD (begins circa 1975)
The third period of international law — that of civil society —
captures emerging patterns of behavior in international
relations. It focuses on the movement away from an emphasis
on state values to a growing concern for human values.35 Louis
Henkin wrote:
State autonomy remains a powerful value, but the
distinction between state and human values continues to
converge. The right of a state “to be let alone” subsumes
the rights of its inhabitants to be let alone, to maintain their
traditions and culture, as well as their ways of life.36
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Table 3 shows the growth in multilateral treaty activity in the
areas of human rights and more broadly in human welfare.
(Human welfare includes items like health and food safety that
do not fall directly under human rights and are included in the
table as “Other Human Welfare.”) Although increasing in
numbers, multilateral treaties that address human rights and
human welfare still generally account for less than 15% of
overall multilateral treaty activity.
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TABLE 3:
MULTILATERAL TREATIES
AND

HUMAN WELFARE

BY

PERIOD

1648-1995
Time Period

Total # of

Breakdown

Treaties

Number

Percent of Total

1648-1750

86

0

1751-1850

100

Human rights: 13

13%

1851-1899

338

Human rights: 5

1%

Other human

1900-1925

663

welfare: 6

2%

Human rights: 50

8%

Other human

1926-1950

1183

welfare: 18

3%

Human rights: 119

10%

Other human

1951-1975

2047

welfare: 25

2%

Human rights: 119

6%

Other human

1976-1995

1619

welfare: 39

2%

Human rights: 86

5%

Other human
welfare: 25
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2%

Power today is not only in the hands of 189 states and
governments and the international institutions they have
created, but also in those of private entities — multinational
corporations, networks of individuals, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs).
The burgeoning influence of nongovernmental organizations
has generated a rich literature. Although the character of their
long-term influence is not fully understood, there seems little
disagreement that nongovernmental organizations are now a
permanent feature of the international political landscape.
Table 4 shows that the increase in the number of both IGOs and
NGOs in the 20th century is impressive, but with a much more
dramatic increase in the number of NGOs.

TABLE 4:
NUMBER

OF

IGOS

AND

NGOS

BY

SELECTED YEARS
Year

Number of IGOs

Number of NGOs

1909

37

176

1951

123

832

1972

280

2173

1984

365

4615

David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on
State, Power, and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1989), p. 232.
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Fewer than 300 NGOs were represented at the 1972 UN
Environment Conference in Stockholm. At the 1992
environment conference in Rio, there were 1,400 NGOs
attending the parallel NGO forum. In the area of human
rights, at the 1993 UN World Human Rights Conference in
Vienna, 248 NGOs were registered with 593 participants. At
the Mexico City UN Women’s Conference in 1975, 6,000
people attended the NGO forum. In 1985, there were 13,500
individuals registered for the Nairobi UN Women’s Conference.
And at the 1995 UN Women’s Conference in Beijing, over
300,000 individuals attended.37
The NGO “cottage industry” has grown to such an extent that
an intergovernmental gathering can be overshadowed by the
activities of NGOs. NGOs increasingly have their own programs
and activities. But their presence has created an additional
source of political pressure that, if linked to other issues or to
state sponsors, can develop into a potent political force. The
prominence of women’s issues on the international agenda
today and the adoption of treaties like the Landmines
Convention and the Statute for an International Criminal
Court, are examples of strategic NGO-state alliances that
resulted in highly effective political lobbying.38
One study of NGO influence at world conferences concluded
that: “[t]heir importance resides in their role as monitors of
governments perceived as unlikely or unable to resolve global
problems.”39 Another observer of UN conference activity wrote
that: “The expertise and experience of NGOs are invaluable
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inputs in decisionmaking processes, and UN conferences have
significantly helped legitimize the participation of civil society
in international arenas.”40 The ongoing work of NGOs will
depend somewhat on the opportunities states and state
institutions (including intergovernmental conferences) provide
for direct or parallel activities from NGOs and how able NGOs
are to seize these opportunities or to create additional ones. The
1999 demonstrations in Seattle during the World Trade
Organization summit and subsequent protests during economic
summits are examples of efforts — not all successful — to create
new opportunities. NGOs have demonstrated their capacities as
political forces and information resources and now draw on a
growing coterie of individuals experienced in the related
functions of international diplomacy and communication at
high profile venues.
Voluntary networks have also demonstrated their power to
influence states in the monitoring of state conduct in the
treatment of their own citizens. “Principled issue networks,” as
agents for change in state behavior and even in international
standards, are a force for social change that appear to have
emerged from the increased level of private transnational
activity. Made possible through resources provided by
foundations, spurred on by the commitment of individuals, and
held together by new technologies, these transnationally linked
organizations have had some notable achievements particularly
in the protection of human rights.41 The growing influence of
the nongovernmental sector is seen through the consideration
now being given in the UN to creating a people’s assembly that
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would parallel the General Assembly as a regularly scheduled
conclave, in contrast to the somewhat sporadic convening of
world conferences or summits that have up to now been the
principal focus for NGO activity.
These elements are sometimes grouped under the term “civil
society,” and they have been important curbs on state power —
not only the power of states to do damage to other states, but
also their power to harm individuals within their own territory.
The events of fall 1998 surrounding Spain’s request to the
United Kingdom for the extradition of former Chilean President
Augusto Pinochet are an example of this emerging area of legal
and individual accountability for actions taken by serving
government officials. The civil society image regards states as
incapable of solving some problems, and as a contributing
factor to other problems, whether environmental damage, weak
economic and political development, or the abuse of individual
human rights.
The technical character of many of the problems requiring
international attention and the multi-sector cooperation needed
to address them are also part of the explanation for the
prominence and recognition of the power of the nongovernmental sector. Technology has also “broken governments’
monopoly on the collection and management of large amounts
of information.”42
Events leading up to the signing of the convention to ban the
use of anti-personnel landmines (Ottawa Convention, 1997)
provided a recent example of the new power that individuals
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linked by technology, organized into a political network, and
working in alliance with governments can wield.43 The
internet based campaign spearheaded by Jody Williams gained
sufficient recognition for its efforts to win the Nobel Prize for
Peace in 1997.
NGO involvement in the drafting of the Statute for the
International Criminal Court and their role at the 1998 Rome
intergovernmental conference on the ICC show another kind of
NGO role. Here, the two year run-up to the Rome conference
gave NGOs the opportunity to organize and to build
relationships with UN secretariat staff and other key players in
the drafting. This careful cultivation by the NGO coalition of
opportunities for participation and influence paid off. At the
end of the process, one NGO participant concluded that:
“Governments and the team from the [UN] Office of Legal
Affairs came to accept NGOs as indispensable consultants and
worthwhile advocates.”44 That there may be as many ways for
NGOs to be influential as there are issues does not diminish the
general conclusion that they have become a political force on
the international scene that is not likely to vanish.
Even two decades ago, the kind of “people power” generated by
Helsinki Watch, Charter 77, Solidarity and other nongovernmental groups eventually created pressures for human rights
and an end to the Cold War from within the Warsaw Pact
countries themselves. Yet, while it seems clear that the public
sector can no longer function effectively without the
cooperation and participation of the private sector and the
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involvement of individual citizens, it remains true that the
private sector cannot solve all problems without the
infrastructure and coordination that states and international
institutions provide. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was, after
all, an intergovernmental agreement that fostered an important
“human dimension” through its system of follow-up conferences.
The follow-up conferences also provided opportunities for NGOs
seeking to liberalize the political institutions of the Warsaw Pact
countries to gain political legitimacy and for their leaders to gain
confidence in political activism and in the support of the
international media for their efforts. The entire process fostered
nothing less than a quiet and largely bloodless revolution.45

Evaluating the Civil Society Legacy
The civil society approach has much to commend in its open
and broad based concept of participants in the international
system. But it also has the potential of falling once again into
Carr’s utopian trap and moving law away from power. One
particular area of danger is where NGOs push law beyond where
an important power like the United States feels able to go, as the
Peace Leagues of the 1930s demanded behavior from Britain
that ultimately undermined their own goals. The lessons of the
two earlier periods were twofold: that power needs to be
recognized, and that long term commitments by key states are
required for effective institution building and normative
development. At the same time, the major powers need to
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realize that power alone is not sufficient to operate effectively,
and that their interests require the structured frameworks that
international cooperation can provide.
In other words, the operating and normative systems of
international law must remain in alignment, so that the
normative needs of the community can be met through existing
but adaptable legal frameworks. What duties and obligations
does the wider international community have with regard to
individuals in their relationship with their own governing
authorities? This is one dimension of the question the civil
society poses for the operating system of international law
today. Another question is the level of recognition to be given
by states to the increasingly mobilized and politically vocal
private associations active in the world today.
Both the operating and the normative systems of international
law are facing these questions. How well international law will
succeed in answering them depends on whether norms
generated today meet the three-fold test of legal effectiveness:
Are they clear and readily understood? Is there sufficient
structure to put them into effect? And is there sufficient
political consensus and political will to use them? Where the
operating and normative do not appear well able to support
each other, and where one of the three elements of effectiveness
may not be in alignment, we are likely to face a situation where
power and law may be too far apart to support the successful
beginning of a new legal regime. These are the questions we
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face as we look into the issues of global governance for the 21st
century.

7. CONCLUSION
Carr was right to remind us that law cannot always provide
solutions. Where Carr fell short, however, was in his failure to
appreciate the framework for political discourse that law
provides. Such a framework, when accepted as legitimate by
the holders of power — the major states in the system —
enables these states to make collective progress toward finding
common solutions for regional and global issues. The
upcoming decades will give us ample opportunity to test
whether our current framework can adapt to changing global
issues and diffusion of power.
From the mechanics of state behavior and relations established
in the voluntarist period, international law moved to restrain
the power of states to wage war and to address a growing list of
transnational issues in the institutionalist period. Although
international institutions failed to eliminate war and conflict,
they have shown a capacity to address an historically
unprecedented agenda of international concerns. These
concerns in turn have further changed the power structure in
international law, producing the third period of civil society.
Although the voluntarist period seems to have promoted little
beyond a state’s authority to govern itself and its freedom to
pursue international relations, a closer look reveals that self-
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preservation was a value that created enough commonality of
interest to be regarded as forming the basis of some
community.46 The common interest went a step further to
create the institutionalist period. These two periods continue to
dwell uneasily together. Yet, the institutional structures and
experiences of working together have provided the modes to
address other areas of international concern that are now
recognized - areas of environmental protection, economic wellbeing, and the protection of individual rights of citizens against
the abuses of their own governments. This, in turn, has
empowered the private sector to create additional political force
through civil society.
The challenge now is for civil society to recognize the same
lessons that international institutions had to learn in the early
twentieth century. That is, to be effective requires working with
what came before rather than rejecting it, even if that which
came before is, in part the source of the problem. The demands
of civil society have made identification of the norms and
values of international law more complex, as the number of
“authoritative decision-makers” and the number of subjects of
international concern increase. This complexity puts greater
reliance on a robust operating system to support appropriate
political discourse and action.
Meeting the ongoing challenges of the future requires the ability
to assess and to marshal resources for appropriate decision
making. These include not only individuals skilled to address
particular issues and resources, but also information to assess
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and to understand the problems being faced, and adequate
political backing to understand the range of acceptable political
behavior and the leadership required. Management of problems
and the solution of problems should not be confused, but until
the time is right for a solution, effective management, including
the use of legal instruments, can be an important interim step.
I hope that considering these three periods has provided some
indication of how international law has expanded the political
space over the centuries to draw together elements of power,
conflict, and interests into the international law-making and
implementation process. From a passive reflection of power in
the voluntarist period, to the interventionist effort to manage
power in the institutionalist period, to the civil society period of
diffused power, international law has evolved to respond to
political change. In each case, it has created the space needed
for fruitful interaction. These changes have not always come
about peacefully or without cost and failure, but they have been
effectively incorporated in the international system where the
required elements of clarity, acceptability, and political
consensus exist.
Throughout, we see that the effectiveness of international law
depends on an accurate assessment of the power bases and
political contexts in which legal standards and obligations must
operate. Providing adequate space for political discourse and
action is, I believe, key to global governance in the future. The
large number of issues that characterize today’s highly
competitive and intensely political environment makes it hard
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to predict what the next crisis will be. As a result, only the
availability of a ready and flexible framework with a growing
and engaged body politic can provide a mode through which to
define and to forge a solution. International law has
demonstrated its ability to play its part in fostering this
framework. I hope my presentation has helped explain how it
has done so. I believe that our acceptance of the important
contribution of international law as an operating system is
essential towards generating a continuing and expanding global
consensus on international norms.
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